5. Are there any issues not included in ELAC's Ethics, Law and Social Science Briefing that you think it is important for ELAC to consider?
Current donor screening guidelines are primarily concerned with physiological health. However, psychological health is also important to donor screening, and is already forming the basis of screening decisions.
See, for example, the case of Helen Keeler, a woman who wishes to be an altruistic egg donor (at a time when there is a shortage of egg donors) but who has been repeatedly rejected as a donor (including at the four hospitals offering fertility treatment within a 40-mile radius of where she lives), due to the fact that one of her children has Asperger's syndrome. This is despite the fact that there exists no guideline specifically deprecating gamete donation by people who have, or whose family members have, autism spectrum disorders such as Asperger's syndrome. Rather, the rejection of Helen Keeler's offer to be an egg donor is an inevitable consequence of risk aversion on the part of non-specialist clinicians, combined with the fact that autism spectrum disorders are partially hereditary.
This points to a broader problem. Heritable neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism have increasingly become characterised as existing on a spectrum of severity, ranging from severe (and rare) to mild (and common) impairments. This tendency will continue with the forthcoming (fifth) edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, in which all autism spectrum disorders might be collapsed into a single category. Gamete screening guidelines need to stay abreast of these developments.
If these issues are not addressed, then clinicians will find themselves in the invidious position of trying to avoid litigation from people with conditions who wish to be gamete donors (alleging discrimination if they are refused), while also trying to avoid litigation from fertility patients (alleging negligence if their donor-conceived children develop conditions that donors were not screened for). The logical solution to this conundrum is to provide prospective recipients of donor gametes with information about the medical and family history of donors, and then let the recipient decide whether or not they consider this history problematic, thereby indemnifying the clinician.
6. Are there any issues which ELAC has previously discussed, but which you think need further discussion?
No.
7. If next year ELAC were to consider fertility preservation, information for patients consenting to their details being used for research, implications of the Equality Act 2010, and mitochondrial exchange, how would you prioritise these issues? What are your reasons for this order?
In descending order of importance:
Mitochondrial exchange to prevent transmission of mitochondrial DNA disease is a priority issue, because this technique has great therapeutic potential, and yet its therapeutic applications are subject to regulatory impediment and widespread misunderstanding.
Human DNA is commonly associated with human personhood, and yet mitochondria carry no genetic information that defines any specifically human attribute. This results in ethical concerns that a child resulting from pronuclear transfer has 'three parents' (concerns that are as misguided, if not more so, as ethical concerns that the recipient of a donated organ has 'four parents').
Fertility preservation is also a priority issue, because of the increasing prevalence of late motherhood. This phenomenon brings attendant fertility problems and conflicts of opinion, including vituperative disparagement of older mothers, and the suggestion by some that it is unethical to enter one's dotage before one's children achieve adulthood (or even middle age).
Autologous egg donation via freezing and vitrification come under the auspices of this issue, because they are often used not only in the face of foreseeable fertility problems, but also as a 'just-in-case' precautionary measure. This is part of a broader interest in the idea of 'futureproofing' one's fertility, against both pathological infertility and the natural decline in fertility that occurs over the course of one's life.
While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the ambition of futureproofing one's fertility, there is a risk that current techniques for so doing become subject to unrealistic expectations. There is no guarantee, at present, that preserved gametes or embryos can be used to ensure a future pregnancy. So anyone who defers parenthood, in the expectation that preserved gametes or embryos can be used to insure against future infertility, risks profound disappointment if every future attempt at fertility treatment is unsuccessful.
8. Do you have any further comments or suggestions for ELAC?
No.