Report Review: Eugenics and the Ethics of Selective Reproduction

In the era of reproductive technology, the prospect of eugenics has re-emerged in multiple new guises, variously presenting itself as a valuable
weapon against the ruthlessness of nature, or as a vicious tool for the
advancement of corrupt ideologies. The polarising power of this concept is part
of its fascination, but this is not necessarily fruitful for debate or
policy-making. In their booklet, 'Eugenics and the Ethics of Selective Reproduction', Stephen Wilkinson and Eve Garrard address this problem. Firstly, they seek to
clarify what is meant by the term eugenics, and secondly, whether eugenic
practices are inevitably immoral. The third and fourth sections deal with selective
reproduction: the selection of disabled children, and sex selection. The
authors apply the reasoning developed in the first two sections in an attempt
to show that the ethical acceptability of these practices cannot be ascertained
solely by demonstrating that they are (or are not) eugenic.

The first essay, on the language of eugenics, addresses the problems
associated with defining the term. The authors are surely right to observe that
productive debate is hindered if the parties involved have different
understandings of the eugenics. Yet worrying about the quality of 'debate' is perhaps
a rather rarified concern. However, the authors suggest that this is not just
an academic issue, since misguided beliefs about eugenics may be responsible
for 'holding back' research. For Wilkinson and Garrard, this is more than
simply a matter of terminology, or philosophical pondering. Improving the
debate may at the same time benefit society at large.

All research, of course, has the potential to be either
harmful or beneficial. But the question of what constitutes harm or benefit is
as fraught as that of what 'eugenics' really is. It seems possible that some of
those who object to certain eugenic endeavours may base their ideas on the fact
that the 'goods' it yields are not — to them — goods worth striving for. The
authors acknowledge that there may be differences in interpretation of what
constitutes benefit, but sweep forward with their argument rather than engaging
fully with the complexity of this problem. This glibness is understandable here
given the limited scope of the booklet, but the authors' expectation that their
clarification of the terminology will solve many of these problems is perhaps over-optimistic
in its failure to address deeper underlying moral differences.

This quibble aside, the authors' suggested definition of
eugenics as 'the attempt to improve the human gene pool' seems to be a sensible
starting point, though as they note, it leaves some scope for dispute over
whether the 'attempt' has to be active/deliberate or passive/unintended. They
go on to discuss the distinctions between authoritarian or coercive eugenic
activities, and between eugenic activities intended to eradicate disease, or to
enhance particular attributes. Their analysis of these issues is admirably
lucid and concise, and provides a very useful framework for thinking about the means
by which eugenic aspirations are undertaken separately from the intentions
behind eugenic activities.

Garrard and Wilkinson show clearly that the eugenics is a
many-faceted concept, and that it has a great deal of symbolic and emotive
power. They raise an interesting question about whether the emotive aspects of
the term are inherently at odds with the possibility of rational debate,
concluding that in fact the provocative element can galvanise people into
thinking about things in new ways. Having clarified their own use of the term
eugenics, and unpicked some of the assumptions and emotive responses associated
with it, Wilkinson and Garrard turn to the question of whether what is eugenic
is necessarily immoral. It is fairly easy for the reader to guess their answer
to this from the tone of the preceding material, and indeed, their conclusion
is compelling. It would be hard for anyone to maintain a conviction that
eugenics (on Wilkinson and Garrard's definition) is invariably wrong.

The subsequent sections of the booklet address particular
uses of selective reproductive technology. Again, these offer a lucid, concise
outline of the relevant arguments, and some interesting, if provocative,
conclusions, compellingly argued. They suggest that the use of PGD for example,
to select for disability, cannot
usually be said to harm the child if it could not have existed without that
particular condition. If we cannot say that a child is harmed by virtue of
having being conceived with a disability, it is still less likely that we can
say a child is harmed by being selected for his/her sex; given this, it is not
surprising that the authors also argue that sex selection is acceptable — in
the UK at any rate.

Not all readers are likely to agree with Wilkinson and
Garrard's conclusions. But the strength of this set of essays is that the delineation
of the issues is so scalpel-sharp that some readers may find for the first time
that they can clearly identify exactly where their objections are located in the logical structure of the arguments.

If it is fair to speak of a weakness in so short a booklet,
perhaps it would be that the strident anti-eugenics position that Wilkinson and
Garrard so convincingly refute seems to have a faint whiff of straw about it.
There are many ignorant, unthinking users of eugenics rhetoric and these can
easily be vanquished. There are richer, more nuanced objections to eugenics
that might be harder to defeat, but this is not the task that Wilkinson and
Garrard have set for themselves.